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Abstract: This paper examine a class of two-sided matching prob-
lems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally diﬀerentiated,
and each would prefer to be matched with a similar partner; in short,
“like attracts like”. Although such preferences imply a unique stable
matching, the degree of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend
critically on the distribution of characteristics among the two sexes.
In particular, the greater the diﬀerence between men and women, the
greater the tendency to negative assortment. Constraints on who can
match with whom may improve welfare and we interpret this as a theory
of social stratification.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Two-sided matching has been described as one of the great sucesses of game theory
(Aumann, 1990). The matching framework provides a natural and fruitful way to
model a wide variety of problems where the side of a transaction to which each
agent belongs can be taken as given; e.g. marriage (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Becker,
1981), university admissions (Gale and Shapley, 1962), hospital intern programs
(Roth, 1984), and auctions (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Furthermore, a standard
matching set-up often sits at the centre of more elaborate models in which the
primary focus is search or the role of matching frictions, for example in labour
markets (Coles and Burdett, 1999), in bilateral exchange (Kiyotaki and Wright,
1989), or in the rationing of electicity supply (McAfee, 2002).
An obvious question to ask of the outcome of many matching markets is whether
they display positive assortment. For instance, do richer men marry richer women?
Or do cleverer students go to more prestigious universities? In the case of fully
transferable utility, a well established result is that regardless of the distribution
of types matching will display positive assortment if the combined output of two
matched agents is a supermodular function of their characteristics.2 If utility is
partially but not fully transferable (i.e. if the utility possibility frontier for any pair
of agents is downward sloping but not linear) then, as Legros and Newman (2003)
show, positive assortment can be guaranteed by a further condition on how the
degree of transferability depends on the two agents’ types.
If utility is not transferable at all (the utility possibility frontier for any pair
of agents is rectangular), matters are very diﬀerent. Agents can assess and rank
potential partners without the need to take into account where they will be on the
utility possibility frontier. When considering beauty, or intelligence, or prestige,
it might be reasonable to assume that all agents on one side of the market agree
on how they rank the agents on the other side: everyone would prefer a more
attractive spouse; all students would prefer to go to a more prestigious university;
all universities would prefer to admit a cleverer student. With agents displaying
such vertical heterogeneity, the most desirable agent on one side will match with
the most desirable on the other side, the second most desirable agents will match
with each other, and so on. Thus positive assortment will arise if there are no
2Recently, Legros and Newman (2002) have provided weaker suﬃcent conditions for positive
assortment.
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matching frictions and agents can freely choose with whom they match.
On the other hand, agents may be horizontally diﬀerentiated, and prefer to
match with someone who is similar to them, or who fits in with their own objectives
or capabilities; in brief, like may be attracted to like. For example, a man might
prefer a wife of the same height, or who has similar tastes. A student might prefer to
go to a college where the courses are pitched at a level suitable to his or her ability;
a college might prefer a less able student because it has a mission, and the specialist
expertise, to educate the less gifted, not just the cleverest. A hospital specialising in
cancer care and research may prefer the academically oriented intern who has done
well in oncology, whereas the hospital with a vacancy in its busy city centre Accident
and Emergency department would prefer an intern with practical skills who can work
under pressure. With preferences such as these, it is not at all clear that positive
sorting will be the outcome, however desirable. For example, it may be that for a
hospital there are no graduating medical students with the exact mix of abilities
and character that it seeks; but its preferred candidate, of those available, would
prefer to work at another hospital. Similarly, for a prospective intern there may be
no vacancy in her ideal hospital. Who then gets matched with whom is of course the
very stuﬀ of matching theory. But somewhat remarkably, once we move away from
fully transferable utility, “for the analyst seeking to characterize the equilibrium
matching patterns in such settings, there is little theoretical guidance” (Legros and
Newman, 2003, p.2). This paper goes some way to fill that gap. I analyse matching
and sorting when utility is non-transferable and like attracts like. However, rather
than look for conditions under which we get complete positive assortment, I focus
on what determines the degree of assortment.
To explain why some matching problems result in a greater degree of assortment
than others we should ideally use an equilibrium concept that produces unique
equilibria. The central solution concept in matching theory is the stable matching,
which pairs the members of one set (e.g. men) with those of another, disjoint, set
(e.g. women), in such a way that no man and woman who are not paired with each
other would both prefer to leave their partners and marry each other.3 Gale and
Shapley proved in 1962 that such an equilibrium exists, but without restrictions on
preferences there will generally be multiple stable matchings. With n men and n
women, there are n! possible matchings; if n is a power of 2 it is possible to find
preferences such that there are at least 2n−1 stable matchings (Irving and Leather,
3The set of the stable matchings can be seen as the core of a game in which the only allowable
coalitions are pairs consisiting of one man and one woman.
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1986).
To illustrate how multiple stable matchings can arise, and how uniqueness can
result from restrictions on preferences, here is a “Greek tragedy”, adapted from
Racine’s play Andromaque. Orestes, son of the Greek king Agamemnon, loves He-
len of Troy’s daughter Hermione, who loves Achilles’ son Pyrrhus, who loves Andro-
maque, widow of the Trojan hero Hector. Departing from Racine, let us suppose
that Andromaque loves Orestes. The term “loves” is to be interpreted as “prefers,
out of the members of the opposite sex”. Figure 1 illustrates. There are two possible
matchings: either Orestes is paired with Hermione, and Pyrrhus with Andromaque,
or Orestes is paired with Andromaque, and Pyrrhus with Hermione. Both of these
matchings are stable.4
Orestes Hermione
PyrrhusAndromaque
Figure 1: A Greek Tragedy. Arrows indicate the preferred member of the opposite
sex.
As Figure 1 suggests, the preferences described above display a certain circular-
ity, which must be broken to achieve uniqueness. Two ways suggest themselves. If
Orestes and Pyrrhus both love Andromaque, then in equilibrium she would have to
be matched with her preferred man, Orestes, leaving Pyrrhus paired with Hermione.
Thus one approach is to assume all agents on one side of the market have the same
preferences, with the actual matching detemined by the preferences of the other side
(the most preferred women gets her man, the second most preferred women gets her
preferred man from those who are left, and so on). This route to uniqueness was
identified by Gusfield and Irving (1989), although their main interest was in algo-
rithms designed to find all stable matches. A special case arises if both sides have
4I am assuming any marriage is better then remaining single.
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common preferences, as in the cases of vertical diﬀerentiation described above.
Alternatively, our population of Greeks may be horizontally diﬀerentiated. Sup-
pose that each person prefers someone closer to them in height, and consider two
possibilities:
Case 1: Orestes and Hermione are both 1.70m tall, and Pyrrhus and Andromaque
are both 1.80m tall. Then there is a unique stable matching, in which Orestes is
matched with Hermione and Pyrrhus with Andromaque. This matching displays
positive assortment, the taller man being paired with the taller woman.
Case 2: Hermione is 1.70m tall, Andromaque and Orestes are 1.80m tall, and
Pyrrhus is 1.90m tall. Then Orestes and Andromaque, being the same height, are
perfectly matched, and must be paired in equilibrium, leaving Hermione and Pyrrhus
also paired in the unique stable matching. In Case 2, the taller man is paired with
the shorter woman, so the matching displays negative assortment.
These two cases illustrate the themes that are developed in the remainder of this
paper. Firstly, if preferences are such that each agent would most like to match with
someone who is similar to themselves, then there is a unique stable matching. This
is a straightforward application of a more general result concerning preferences that
satisfy a No Crossing Condition, due to Clark (2002), and is discussed in Section 2.
Secondly, uniqueness of the stable matching need not imply a positive association
between partners’ characteristics. Even in the case where everyone would prefer to
match with a partner of a similar type, not everyone will get their preferred mate, as
Hermione and Pyrrhus found out in the previous paragraph. A comparison of Cases
1 and 2 above suggests that the distribution of agents’ characteristics is critical
in determining the degree of assortment. Section 3 formalises this by taking the
agents’s characteristics to be evenly (and in the limit uniformly) distributed, and
deriving an exact form of one measure of the degree of sorting, the rank correlation
between agents’ characteristics and their partners’. We then show how this measure
depends on the parameters of the two distributions. Section 4 considers the welfare
loss when sorting is not completely positive, and considers possible responses. We
show that constraints on who can match with whom typically improve welfare and
we tentatively interpret this as a theory of social stratification. Section 5 of the
paper concludes.
4
2 WHEN LIKE ATTRACTS LIKE
2.1 The matching framework
We consider two finite and disjoint sets, both with n elements. For simplicity we
shall refer to these as a set of men M = {m1, m2, ...mn} and a set of women
W = {w1, w2, ...wn}, and consider them as ordered subsets of R, the real line, so
mi < mj and wi < wj if i < j. We refer to P =M ∪W as the population. We can
thus identify any member of P with a number, which for convenience we refer to as
his or her height. In order to capture the idea that each person would prefer to be
paired with a similar member of the opposite sex we assume that a man m prefers
woman wi to woman wj if |m− wi| < |m− wj| . Similarly, woman w prefers man
mi to man mj if |w −mi| < |w −mj| . The matching framework we adopt requires
each agent to have a strict preference ranking over members of the opposite sex.
SinceM , W ⊂ R, no two men or no two women are of exactly the same height, but
we further assume that if m − wi = wj − m > 0 then m prefers wi to wj; and if
w−mi = mj−w > 0 then w prefers mj to mi.5 Lastly, we assume that each person
always prefers any partner of the opposite sex to remaining single.
2.2 Existence of equilibrium
Having described the marriage market, we now define the equilibrium concept.
Definition 1 A matching µ of the population P is a one-to-one function from P
onto itself such that (i) m = µ(w) if and only if w = µ(m); (ii) if m ∈ M then
µ(m) ∈W and if w ∈W then µ(w) ∈M.
Definition 2 A matching µ can be blocked by a pair (m, w) ∈ M ×W for whom
m 6= µ(w) if m strictly prefers w to µ(m) and w strictly prefers m to µ(w). A
matching µ is stable if it cannot be blocked by any pair.
Then as Gale and Shapley proved in 1962:
Proposition 1 A stable matching of the population P exists.
5This diﬀerence in the way of resolving male and female indiﬀerence may seem arbitrary, but
nothing important depends on it. Furthermore, although it is well known that lexicographic
orderings can create problems for the representation of preferences by utility functions, at this
stage we do not require utility functions, only preference orderings.
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2.3 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The preferences described above have a particular structure which ensures a unique
stable matching. Consider two men, mi and mj, and two women, wk and wl such
that mi < mj and wk < wl. Then it cannot be the case that mi prefers wl and mj
prefers wk; the shorter man cannot prefer the taller woman and at the same time
the taller man prefer the shorter woman. All other combinations are possible but
we can rule out the preferences shown in Figure 2. Similarly it cannot be the case
mi mj
wk wl
n n
n n
Figure 2: Preferences ruled out by the no crossing condition.
that wk prefers mj and wl prefers mi. We now have:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique stable matching, µ∗.
To give an idea of how the unique stable matching may be found, we identify
fixed pairs of the population P . A fixed pair is a couple {m, w} ∈ M ×W who
prefer each other over all other available partners. For any man m, consider his
preferred woman in W , denoted θ(m). She is not necessarily the same height as m;
this depends on the exact membership of the set W. Similarly, let γ(w) denote w’s
preferred man in M. Then γ(θ(m)) is the preferred man of m’s preferred woman.
If m = γ(θ(m)), then since m prefers θ(m) and θ(m) prefers m, the couple {m,
θ(m)} are a fixed pair and must be matched in equilibrium.6 The population P
must have at least one fixed pair, because the function γ(θ(m)) is non-decreasing
in m (this follows from the No-Crossing Condition) and therefore has a fixed point
in M (which is finite). If we take out the fixed pairs of P , we are left with a sub-
population P 0 ⊂ P , which must also satisfy the No Crossing Condition. Hence P 0
6If m 6= γ(θ(m) think of γ(θ(m) as m’s rival. If θ(m) = w, m has no rival but as m = γ(w),
then w = θ(γ(m)), so w has no rivals either.
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has at least one fixed pair, and these must also be matched in any stable matching
of P , leaving a sub-population P 00 ⊂ P 0. We carry on in this way, until the whole
population is matched.
As an example, suppose M = {1.41, 1.42, 1.48, 1.54, 1.77}, and W = {1.05,
1.12, 1.39, 1.75, 1.82}. Then the fixed pairs of P are {1.41, 1.39} and {1.77, 1.75},
the fixed pairs of P 0 are {1.42, 1.12} and {1.54, 1.82}, leaving P 00 ={1.48, 1.05},
who must be paired with each other. The resulting matching is shown in Figure 3.
1.42
●
1.41
●
1.77
●
1.54
●
1.48
●
●
1.05
●
1.39
●
1.12
●
1.75
●
1.82
M
W
Figure 3: A unique equilibrium matching
2.4 Positive assortment
If individuals prefer similar partners, then it might be expected that in equilibrium
they will tend to be matched with partners who are close to their ideal, and hence
that taller men will be matched with taller women. But as Figure 3 shows, this
intuition turns out to be misleading: “like attracts like” does not imply that “like
is matched with like”, and consequently need not result in positive assortment.
One measure of the degree of sorting is Spearman’s rank correlation statistic,
denoted by Λ. This captures the monotonocity of a matching. In the example of
Figure 3, Λ = 0.5. Does the assumption of “like attracts like” put any restrictions on
what values can be taken by Λ? Obviously, ifM =W , then Λ = 1. In this case each
man can find an identical and hence ideal woman, and vice versa, and the population
P forms immediately into n perfectly matched fixed pairs. In contrast, Λ = −1 if
either (i) the tallest woman is no taller than the shortest man, or (ii) the tallest
man is no taller than the shortest woman. In the first instance, the population P
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has only one fixed pair, the shortest man and the tallest woman, so they are matched
in equilibrium; P 0 has only one fixed pair, the second shortest man and the second
tallest woman, so they are matched in equilibrium; and so on, until the tallest man
is matched with the shortest woman. An example of this was given in Case 2 of the
Introduction.
Thus no general restrictions on the degree of assortment are imposed by the
assumption that “like attracts like”. However, suppose that although women are on
average shorter than men the tallest woman is taller than the shortest man; i.e. let
w1 < m1 < wn < mn. There is then some “overlap” in height between the two sexes.
If n = 2, we may still find that Λ = −1; for example if M = {1, 4} and W = {3,
6}, there is one fixed pair of P , {4, 3}, leaving {1, 6} as the other matched pair.
But in a large population, there may be a significant number of men and women
between m1 and wn, and so we might expect to find some fixed pairs in this range.
If P has at least two fixed pairs, then Λ > −1. This follows from the No Crossing
Condition: within the sub-population who constitute the fixed pairs of P there must
be perfect positive assortment; otherwise we would be able to find preferences of the
type illustrated in Figure 1. Thus the overall population P cannot display perfect
negative assortment.
Alternatively, suppose that men and women are on average the same height,
but there is more variation in one sex; e.g. m1 < w1 < wn < mn. For n = 2, this
population must sort positively: m1 matches with w1, and m2 with w2, so Λ = 1.
For large n, there may be many men whose height is between w1 and wn, and who
then find women with whom to form fixed pairs. Again this sub-population must
sort positively. But we are now left with a sub-population P 0 consisting of (i) men
who are either shorter than w1 or taller than wn, or who did not find a woman in
the range w1 to wn; and (ii) women between w1 and wn. It cannot be an equilibrium
for P 0 to sort positively, because that would imply that the shortest woman in P 0
would match with m1 and such a matching would be blocked by her and the tallest
man shorter than w1. If P 0 has some negative sorting then the overall population P
cannot display perfect positive assortment and Λ < 1.
These arguments suggest two ways in which we can put some structure on the
determination of the degree of assortment, and these are pursued in the next section.
Firstly, we focus on the extent and nature of “overlap” between the sets M and W .
If there are intervals of R which contain numbers of both men and women, this is
where we will find the fixed pairs of P , even if the concentrations of men and women
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in any particular interval are diﬀerent. This is important not only because within the
fixed pairs of P there must be positive assortment, but also because it is thorough
the emergence of fixed pairs in successively smaller sub-populations that we can
find the unique stable matching and hence analyse its characteristics. Secondly, we
analyse large setsM andW . This enables us to impose a degree of regularity on the
distribution of height between the two sexes. Throughout we continue to assume
that n is finite, but of special interest is what happens as n tends to infinity. We see
that for a particular class of distributions we get remarkably simple and revealing
results on the determination of the degree of assortment.
3 SORTING IN LARGE POPULATIONS
3.1 Fixed pairs in overlapping populations
We begin by making precise the idea that in intervals of R containing large numbers
of both men and women we will find a large number of fixed pairs. Consider an
interval Z = [x, y] ⊂ R. LetMZ = Z∩M , the set of men in Z; similarlyWZ = Z∩W.
We assume thatMZ andWZ both have more than two elements. Suppose that within
MZ height is evenly distributed amongst men, in the sense that there is a constant
diﬀerence dm in height between successively taller men; similarly, within WZ height
is evenly distributed amongst women, with a constant diﬀerence in height dw. If
dm > (resp. <) dw we say that men (resp. women) are sparse in Z and women
(resp. men) are abundant in Z. Note thatMZ andWZ may or may not include x or
y, and that the two sets need have no elements in common. We are not making any
assumptions about how height is distributed outside Z. As an example of two even
distributions, let Z = [1.80, 2.00], MZ = {1.81, 1.84, ..., 1.99}, and WZ = {1.804,
1.824, ..., 1.984}, so dm = 0.03, dw = 0.02 and men are sparse in Z.
To state the main proposition on matching between two evenly distributed
groups of men and women, it is useful to define sets that explicitly exclude the
shortest and tallest elements of MZ and WZ . Let MZ = {m ∈ MZ|minv∈MZ v <
m < maxv∈MZ v} andWZ = {w ∈WZ |minv∈WZ v < w < maxv∈WZ v}.
Proposition 3 (a) If dm > dw then (i) each man in MZ is a member of a fixed
pair of P , and is matched in equilibrium with a woman in WZ; (ii) if a woman in
WZ is a member of a fixed pair of P , then she is matched in equilibrium with a man
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in MZ .
(b) If dm < dw then (i) each woman in WZ is a member of a fixed pair of P , and is
matched in equilibrium with a man in MZ ; (ii) if a man in MZ is a member of a
fixed pair of P , then he is matched in equilibrium with a woman in WZ
(c) If dm = dw then (i) each man in MZ is a member of a fixed pair of P and is
matched in equilibrium with a woman in WZ ; (ii) each woman in WZ is a member
of a fixed pair of P , and is matched in equilibrium with a man in MZ.
Within the interval Z, each member of the sparse sex, with the possible ex-
ception of the shortest and tallest, pairs with their preferred partner, as do some
members of the abundant sex. But there are not enough of the sparse sex to go
round, and so some of the abundant sex are left unsatisfied, in the sense that they
do not match with their preferred partner. To illustrate this, consider the example
above in which Z = [1.80, 2.00], and dm = 0.03 and dw = 0.02. Then MZ = {1.84,
1.87, 1.90, 1.93, 1.96}, who are matched with women {1.844, 1.864, 1.904, 1.924,
1.964} respectively, these two sets forming five fixed pairs of P . Note that there are
women {1.824, 1.884, 1.944}, all in WZ, who are not members of fixed pairs of P .
They make up a proportion 3
8
of WZ, which is close to the proportion 1− dwdm =
1
3
.
Deviations from 1− dw
dm
arise since we are dealing with finite sets. To make this no-
tion precise, consider what happens as we increase the membership of the sets MZ
and WZ , keeping the interval Z = [x, y] fixed, and maintaining the assumption of
two even distributions. We let dm and dw get smaller and smaller, but keep constant
the ratio of dm to dw. Denote by π(S) the proportion of agents in set S who are
members of a fixed pair of P. Then
Proposition 4 Given the interval Z = [x, y], as dm and dw both tend to zero with
dw/dm = δ,
(i) both π(MZ) and π(MZ) tend to min[1, δ−1];
(ii) both π(WZ) and π(WZ) tend to min[1, δ].
3.2 Sorting as correlation
Over the interval Z = [x, y], all of the sparse sex (except possibly the shortest and
tallest) match with their preferred partner. Taller men in MZ prefer and match
with taller women, so within the couples forming these fixed pairs there is positive
assortment. But for values of dm and dw close to zero, the partners in a fixed pair
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must be very close to each other. This has the consequence that if we take as
a measure of sorting the correlation coeﬃcient r between partners’ heights then,
restricting ourselves to the fixed pairs of P where both partners are in Z, this
measure is close to 1. Formally, for any matching µ we can compute the correlation
coeﬃcient between the height of those individuals in any set S = {p1, p2, ..., p#S}
and the height of their partners µ(S) = {µ(p1), µ(p2), ..., µ(p#S)}, where S contains
only men or only women:
r(S, µ) =
Cov(S, µ(S)),
[V ar(S)V ar(µ(S))]0.5
, (1)
where
Cov(S, µ(S) =
1
#S
X
pi∈S
(pi − pS) (µ(pi)− µS) ,
V ar(S) =
1
#S
X
pi∈S
(pi − pS)
2 , pS =
1
#S
X
pi∈S
pi
V ar(µ(S)) =
1
#S
X
pi∈S
(µ(pi)− µS)
2 and µS =
1
#S
X
pi∈S
µ(pi)
If S = M , then r(S, µ) is the correlation coeﬃcient between the height of all men
and their partners; clearly r(M , µ) = r(W , µ), which we denote more simply by
r(µ). We also write r(S, µ∗) as r∗(S), and r∗(M) = r(µ∗) as r∗. We now have for
the case where height is evenly distributed within MZ and WZ:
Proposition 5 Given the interval Z = [x, y], as dm and dw both tend to zero with
dw/dm = δ,
(i) if δ ≤ 1, then r∗(MZ) tends to 1;
(ii) if δ ≥ 1, then r∗(WZ) tends to 1.
3.3 Sorting between two evenly distributed populations
We now apply Propositions 3 to 5 in a simple context. We assume that height is
evenly distributed amongst bothM andW . It is useful to express each distribution
in terms of its mean and spread. Thus
mi = m¯+ sm(
i− 1
n− 1 −
1
2
)
where m is the average height of the men in M and sm is the diﬀerence in height
between the tallest and shortest man; thus the diﬀerence dm between succesively
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taller men is sm/(n− 1). Similarly,
wi = w¯ + sw(
i− 1
n− 1 −
1
2
)
so dw = sw/(n−1). The assumption of two even distributions has the advantage that
one obvious measure of the degree of assortment between the two sexes, Spearman’s
rank correlation statistic Λ, coincides with the correlation coeﬃcient r.
The question now is: what determines the degree of assortment of the unique
stable matching, as measured by r∗? The answer depends largely on the degree of
overlap between the two distributions. There are three possible types of equilibria.
In what follows I assume without loss of generality that sm ≥ sw.
3.3.1 Type 1 matching: no overlap wn ≤ m1 or mn ≤ w1
If wn ≤ m1 the tallest woman is no taller than the shortest man. In this case mi is
the ith most preferred man of each woman, and wi is the ith least preferred woman
of each man, so the sequence of fixed pairs that generates the equilibrium matching
is (m1, wn), (m2, wn−1), ..., (mn−1, w2), (mn, w1). As an example, let n = 15,
m = 1.72 and sm = 0.42, so M = {1.51, 1.54, ..., 1.93}; and let w = 1.345 and
sw = 0.28 so W = {1.205, 1.225, ..., 1.485}. This gives the matching pattern shown
in Figure 4, from which it is clear that there is perfect negative assortment, with
r∗ = −1. Similarly, r∗ = −1 if mn ≤ w1.
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00
men
w
om
en
Figure 4: Type 1 matching
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3.3.2 Type 2 matching: some overlap w1 < m1 < wn < mn or m1 < w1 <
mn < wn
We continue to denote by Z the interval of overlap, so for a Type 2 matching Z equals
[m1, wn] or [w1, mn]. We focus on the former case, where w1 < m1 < wn < mn. If
m1 < w1 < mn < wn and Z = [w1, mn], the analysis follows a similar pattern. The
number of men in Z is denoted by n1.
Proposition 3 shows that since sm ≥ sw each man in MZ forms a fixed pair
of P with his preferred woman, who is in WZ . Since Z = [m1, wn] and the even
distributions extend outside Z to all men and women, we can establish the stronger
result that each man in MZ forms a fixed pair with his preferred woman (although
θ(m1) may be shorter than m1 and thus not in WZ).7 Within the fixed pairs of P
there can only be positive sorting, so as long as n1 ≥ 2 this overlap ensures a degree
of positive assortment. In general there are more women than men in the range of
overlap (because sm ≥ sw), so the remainder of the population consists of women
who range in height between w1 and wn, and men who range between wn and mn.
This subpopulation has no overlap between men and women, and therefore sorts
negatively. Thus the equilibrium matching µ∗ of the population P has elements of
positive and negative assortment. Overall, −1 < r∗ < 1.
To illustrate this, we amend the example of a Type 1 matching above by increas-
ing average female height, keeping all else the same; now w = 1.545 so W = {1.405,
1.425, ..., 1.685}. The interval of overlap is now Z = [1.51, 1.685]; andWZ = {1.525,
1.545..., 1.685}. The fixed pairs of this population are (1.51, 1.505), (1.54, 1.545),
(1.57, 1.565), (1.60, 1.605), (1.63, 1.625), (1.66, 1.665), (1.69, 1.685). This leaves a
subpopulation P 0 of men {1.72, 1.75, ...1.93} and women {1.405, 1.425, 1.445, 1.465,
1.485, 1.525, 1.585, 1.645, }. The tallest woman in P 0 is shorter than the shortest
man so they sort negatively. This gives the overall matching pattern shown in Figure
5, which displays predominantly negative assortment, with r∗ = −0.604.
7We need to show that the least and greatest elements of MZ (m1 and, say, mr respectively)
have no rivals (as defined in Footnote 6). We follow the line of argument used to prove Proposistion
3. If sm > sw, then θ(m1) is less than a distance dm/2 from m1 and more than dm/2 from any
other man; hence m1 = γ(θ(m1)) and they form a fixed pair. This requires that there are no men
shorter than m1. Similarly, mr and θ(mr) must be less than dm/2 apart and hence form a fixed
pair; this relies on the fact that if wn = θ(mq) then wn must be more than dm/2 from mq+1
(because all men, not just those in Z, are separated by a gap dm). If sm = sw and dm = dw = d,
then either (A): m1 is halfway between wt and wt+1for some t, in which case (m1, wt) is a fixed
pair and, since r = n− t, so is (mq, wn−1); or (B) m1 is less than dm/2 from θ(m1). in which case
they form a fixed pair, as do (γ(wn−1), wn−1) and (γ(wn), wn); either γ(wn−1) or γ(wn−1) must
be the greatest element in MZ .
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Figure 5: Type 2 matching
More generally, we can see that a type 2 matching µ∗ has three parts: (i) µ∗1,
the matching of all the n1 men in the interval Z = [m1, wn] with their preferred
partners, each of whom, with the possible exception of θ(m1), is in Z; (ii) µ∗2, the
matching of the n2 remaining women in Z not matched with men in Z by part (i)
- these women are matched with the n2 shortest men taller than wn; and (iii) µ∗3,
the matching of the remaining n3 women, all of whom are shorter than m1, with
the n3 tallest men. It is useful to label the sets of men and women matched by
the component µ∗i of µ
∗ as Mi and Wi respectively (thus M1 = MZ). These sets’
location on the real line is illustrated in Figure 6, where the area of each rectangle
is proportional to the size of the set that it represents.
W1
M1 M2 M3
W2
W3
 w1
●
  m1
●
  wn
●
  mn
 ●
Figure 6: A population with a Type 2 matching; the men in Mi match with the
women in Wi, i = 1, 2, 3.
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It is clear from Figure 5 that the correlation coeﬃcient r∗ of a type 2 equilib-
rium matching with fixed values of the parameters m, w, sm and sw will in general
be a cumbersome function of n. The following proposition allows a considerable
simplification:
Proposition 6 For a type 2 matching with fixed values of the parameters m, w, sm
and sw where sm ≥ sw and w¯ − sw2 < m¯−
sm
2
< w¯ + sw
2
wn < m¯+
sm
2
, as n tends to
infinity
r∗ → 2
µ
sm
sw
¶2
(
sm + sw
2sm
− m¯− w¯
sm
)3 − 1. (2)
If sm ≥ sw and m¯ − sm2 < w¯ −
sw
2
< m¯ + sm
2
< w¯ + sw
2
wn then eq. (2) holds with
m¯− w¯ replaced by w¯ − m¯.
3.3.3 Type 3 matching: m1 ≤ w1 < wn ≤ mn
Here the distribution of women is contained within that of the men. From Propo-
sition 3, each man in MZ forms a fixed pair of P with his preferred woman (as
sm ≥ sw); however, since Z = [w1, wn] and the even distribution of M extends to
men shorter and taller than those in Z , we can show that each man in MZ forms a
fixed pair with his preferred woman8. This leaves a subpopulation consisting of (i)
men who are either strictly shorter than w1 or strictly taller than wn, and (ii) women
who are between w1 and wn but were not matched with the men in this range. The
unique stable matching for this subpopulation can be broken down into two parts,
each with negative assortment. The argument is as follows.
Adopting notation similar to that used in the previous section, let M1 and W1
denote the sets whose members make up the fixed pairs of P , so M1 = MZ, and
let µ∗1 denote the stable matching of the population P1 = M1 ∪W1; thus µ∗1(m) =
µ∗(m) for m ∈ M1. Let M2 be the set of men strictly shorter than w1 and M3
the set of men strictly taller than wn, with #(M2) = n2, and #(M3) = n3; let
M0 = M2 ∪ M3. Consider W0, the set of women not matched with men in the
interval Z; thus #(W0) = n2 + n3. Let W2 be the set of the n2 shortest women in
W0, and W3 the set of the n3 tallest women in W0. These sets’ location on the real
8Let mr and mt be the least and greatest elements of MZ respectively; then w1 ≤ mr < mt ≤
wn. If sm = sw then r = 1, t = n, w1 = m1 and wn = mn, in which case wi forms a fixed pair with
mi for all i. If sm > sw, θ(mr) and θ(mt) must be less than dm/2 from mr and mt respectively,
and thus have no rivals.
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line is illustrated below, where I have assumed, without loss of any generality, that
n2 ≤ n3.
M1M2 M3
W3
  w1
●
  m1
●
  wn
●
W1
W2
  mn
 ●
Figure 7: A population with a Type 3 matching; the men in Mi match with the
women in Wi, i = 1, 2, 3.
Consider the populations P2 =M2 ∪W2 and P3 =M3 ∪W3. Since M2 and W2
do not overlap, then µ∗2, the unique stable matching of P2, displays perfect negative
assortment. Similarly, µ∗3, the unique stable matching of P3, also displays perfect
negative assortment. Denote by µ0 the unique stable matching of P 0 = P2∪P3. Then
Lemma 1 If m ∈M2 then µ0(m) = µ∗2(m); if m ∈M3 then µ0(m) = µ∗3(m).
Thus the overall matching µ∗ contains three parts such that µ∗i (m) = µ
∗(m)
for m ∈ Mi, i = 1, 2, 3. Where there is overlap, µ∗1 matches the fixed pairs of
P and therefore has positive assortment; the two others, µ∗2 and µ
∗
3, have negative
assortment. In addition, there is a positive correlation between the means of the
three groups of men and those of the three groups of women.
To illustrate a type 3 matching, we amend the example of a Type 2 matching
and further increase the mean of W , keeping all else the same; now w = 1.705 so
W = {1.565, 1.585, ..., 1.845}. Then the fixed pairs in the area of overlap are {1.57,
1.565}, {1.60, 1.605}, {1.63, 1.625}, {1.66, 1.665}, {1.69, 1.685}, {1.72, 1.725},
{1.75, 1.745}, {1.78, 1.785}, {1.81, 1.805}, and {1.84, 1.845} leaving subsets of men
M2 = {1.51, 1.54}, who match negatively with W2 = {1.585, 1.645}, and M3 =
{1.87, 1.90, 1.93} who match negatively with W3 = {1.705, 1.765, 1.825}. This
gives the overall matching pattern shown in Figure 8, which displays predominantly
positive assortment, with r∗ = 0.821.
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Figure 8: Type 3 matching
Note that in contrast to type 1 and type 2 matchings, a type 3 matching divides
the population into two groups, shorter and taller, such that shorter men match only
with shorter women, and taller men only with taller men, the definition of shorter
being “less than height h”, where max{w|w ∈W2} ≤ h ≤ min{w|w ∈ W3}. As
n → ∞, h tends to w¯− sw
sm−sw (m¯ − w¯), and the proportion of shorter people to
1
2
− sm
sm−sw (m¯− w¯). In Section 4, we interpret this division as a stratification of the
population.
Akin to Proposition 6 we have:
Proposition 7 For sm ≥ sw and m¯ − sm2 < w¯ −
sw
2
< w¯ + sw
2
wn < m¯ +
sm
2
, as
n→∞
r∗ → sm + sw
2sm
− 6 (m¯− w¯)
2
sm (sm − sw)
(3)
3.3.4 Determinants of the degree of assortment
To summarise the discussion so far, define σ = sw
sm
and ∆ = m¯−w¯
sm
. Then for σ ≤ 1,
as n →∞, r∗ → ρ = f(σ, ∆) where
f(σ,∆) =



−1 if ∆ ≤ −1+σ
2
(Type 1)
2
σ2
(1+σ
2
+∆)3 − 1 if −1+σ
2
< ∆ < −1−σ
2
(Type 2)
1+σ
2
− 6
1−σ∆
2 if −1−σ
2
≤ ∆ < 1−σ
2
(Type 3)
2
σ2
(1+σ
2
−∆)3 − 1 if 1−σ
2
≤ ∆ < 1+σ
2
(Type 2)
−1 if 1+σ
2
≤ ∆ (Type 1)
(4)
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If women vary more in height than men, then equation (4) holds with σ and ∆
redefined as sm/sw and (w¯ − m¯) /sw respectively. Note that ρ is (i) a continuous
function of σ and ∆; (ii) symmetric around ∆ = 0; (iii) increasing as |∆| decreases.
ρ does not necessarily increase with σ, although it does for σ close to 1, and equals
1 only if σ = 1 and ∆ = 0. Figure 9 graphs the relationship between ρ and ∆ for
σ = 0.001, 0.5, and 1.
Figure 9: The degree of assortment, measured by the limiting value of the correlation
coeﬃcient as n→∞.
4 MATCHING AND WELFARE
4.1 Welfare and Correlation
The equilibrium matching µ∗ cannot be Pareto dominated.9 On eﬃciency gounds,
then, there is no reason to object to an equilibrium that displays negative sorting,
even if r∗ = −1. But if matchings are evaluated using a welfare function which is
neutral or averse to inequalities in individual utilities, then negative sorting will
result in a low measure of social welfare if marginal disutility increases with the
9To see this, suppose mi and wj are not matched by µ∗ but are matched by some alternative
matching µ (if µ∗ 6= µ, there must exist some such couple). Since µ∗ cannot be blocked, it cannot
be the case that mi prefers wj to µ∗(mi) and wj prefers mi to µ∗ (wj). As preferences are strict,
either mi or wj (or both) is worse oﬀ when matched by µ.
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diﬀerence |x− y| between a spouse x and his/her partner y . To fix ideas, let ui be
the utility of person i and let
Ω(µ) =
1
2n
X
i∈P
ui
be a social welfare function which takes a simple average of individual utilities, which
in turn depend on how the population P is matched. If m and w are paired, we
denote their combined utility, um + uw, by φ(m, w). Then
Ω(µ) =
1
2n
X
m∈M
φ(m,µ(m)).
We now apply standard results on supermodular functions: if the function φ(m,w) is
supermodular (resp. submodular), then Ω(µ) is maximised when matching displays
perfect (resp. negative) positive assortment; see Topkis (1998), or Legros and New-
man (2002).10 If φ is twice diﬀerentiable, supermodularity (resp. submodularity)
is equivalent to a non-negative (resp. non-positive) cross-partial derivative ∂
2φ
∂m∂w
.
Given Ω(µ), therefore, the welfare consequences of matching depend on the form
of individual utility functions. So far we have dealt only with individual preference
orderings; for example a man m ranks wi above wj if |m− wi| < |m− wj|, with any
tie broken by a preference for the shorter woman. For given sets M ands W, one
way to represent such preferences is by the following utility functions: if m ∈ M is
matched with w ∈W, his utility is
um(w) = − |w −m|α − εw (5)
and hers is
uw(m) = − |m− w|α + εm (6)
where α > 0. Here ε is positive but suﬃciently small that the male preference for
shorter women is never strong enough to overturn the preference for a woman closer
in height; i.e. for any (m,wi, wj) ∈M ×W 2 such that m− wi > wj −m > 0
ε <
(wi −mi)α − (m− wj)α
wj − wi
. (7)
10These results are most commonly used in the case of transferable utility (TU). In the core of
a TU game, total output/utility is maximised, so given such eﬃciency supermodularity implies
positive sorting. In the framework that we consider, utility is non-transferable, so the direction of
reasoning is diﬀerent: given positive sorting, supermodularity implies welfare maximisation.
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Similarly, in order for the female preference for taller men to act only as a tie-breaker
we must also have
ε <
(mj − w)α − (w −mi)α
mj −mi
(8)
for any (mi,mj, w) ∈M2 ×W such that mj − w > w −mi > 0.11
Given these utility functions, φ(m,w) = ε(m−w)−2(|m− w|)α.We can there-
fore express social welfare as
Ω(µ) =
ε
2
(m¯− w¯)− 1
n
X
m∈M
(|m− µ(m)|)α. (9)
φ(m, w) is supermodular if α ≥ 1, so in order to focus on the case where marginal
disutility increases with the diﬀerence |m− µ(m)| we put α = 2. This quadratic
case allows a particularly crisp result on sorting and welfare. Rearranging equation
(9) and bearing in mind the definition of r(µ), we have
Ω(µ) = a+ br(µ) (10)
where
a = −V ar(M)− V ar(W )− (m¯− w¯)2 + ε
2
(m¯− w¯) (11)
b = 2 (V ar(M)V ar(W ))0.5 (12)
Both a and b are unaﬀected by the matching µ, so we see that for a population
with utility functions given by (5) and (6) with α = 2, there is a positive linear
relationship between social welfare and the degree of assortment as measured by
r(µ).
Clearly the quadratic case is special; but even if utility functions are not given
by (5) and (6) , positive sorting maximises an additive social welfare function such as
Ω(µ) if φ(m,w) is supermodular whatever the distribution of types, and maximises
r(µ) whatever the form of the social welfare function or the distribution of types;
negative sorting minimises such functions.12. This provides a broad justification for
11Implicitly this makes ε depend on the actual setsM andW because for any positive ε, however
small, one could construct a population with the utility functions above in which some man, for
example, preferred the “wrong” (i.e. taller) woman despite a greater height diﬀerence compared
to the “right” (i.e. shorter) woman. However for any finite sets M and W we can always choose ε
small enough to satisfy (7) and (8) .
12The correlation coeﬃcient r(µ) can itself be expressed as (c(µ)−a)/b, where a and b are given
by equations (11) and (12), with ε = 0, and c(µ) = 12n
P
m(m − µ(m))2. Since (m − µ(m))2 is a
supermodular function of m and µ(m), c and hence r are maximised (resp. minimised) by perfect
positive (resp. negative) assortment.
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Figure 10: A stratified matching with two strata: men shorter than 1.85 match only
with women shorter than 1.675.
taking r(µ) as a measure of welfare. However in what follows I explicitly assume
an additive social welfare function and that equations (5) and (6) hold with α = 2;
thus Ω(µ) increases if and only if r(µ) increases.
4.2 Welfare benefits of stratification
The results above imply that the equilibrium matching µ∗ typically does not max-
imise social welfare. Indeed, in the case whereM andW do not overlap, µ∗ exhibits
perfect negative sorting, yielding the lowest possible value of social welfare. We now
consider the welfare consequences of a restriction on what matchings can form. In
its most general formulation, this restriction operates as follows. Firstly, we parti-
tion each set M and W into q non-empty subsets, M1, M2, ...Mq and W1, W2, ...Wq
such that: (i) #Mi = #Wi = ni, where
P
i ni = n and (ii) if m ∈ Mi, m0 ∈ Mj
and i < j, then m < m0; and if w ∈ Wi, w0 ∈ Wj and i < j, then w < w0. The
subpopulation Pi =Mi ∪Wi is called the ith stratum of P , and a partitioning of M
and W in the way described above is a stratification of P. Secondly, we permit only
matchings of P that pair together individuals in the same stratum as each other.
Such a matching is called a stratified matching. An example with q = 2, n1 = 8 and
n2 = 12 is given in Figure 10.
It is possible that imposing a stratification may not be a binding constraint on
the equilibrium matching. As Fgures 7 and 8 show, a Type 3 matching has two
strata; men shorter than h match only with women shorter than h, where h divides
W2 from W3. In this case, the population is endogenously stratified. But we might
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impose a diﬀerent statification than that which emerges endogenously. Furthermore,
Type 1 and 2 matchings are not stratified at all. What is the eﬀect of imposing a
stratification in these cases?
Our notion of equilibrium now applies to each stratum of P. The stratum Pi is
eﬀectively a separate marriage market which satisfies the conditions for the existence
of a stable matching. Moreover, Pi, being a subset of P , satisfies the No Crossing
Condition and thus has a unique stable matching µ∗i .We denote by r
∗
i the correlation
coeﬃcient between the height of the men in Pi and their partners’ heights when they
are matched by µ∗i . We denote by eµ the matching of P implied by the q matchings
µ∗1, ..., µ
∗
q (i.e. m = eµ(w) if m = µ∗i (w) for some stratum Pi); similarly we denote byer the correlation coeﬃcient between the height of the men in P and their partners’
heights when they are matched by eµ . Of course eµ and er depend on the stratification
imposed on P.
To fix ideas, suppose all women are shorter than all men, so that µ∗, the equilib-
rium matching when no stratification is imposed, exhibits perfect negative sorting.
Then if q ≥ 2, it must be the case that er is greater than r∗, the correlation coeﬃcient
associated with µ∗. Although each of the matchings µ∗1, ..., µ
∗
q considered separately
exhibits perfect negative sorting, the stratification of P induces some positive cor-
relation: for i < j, all men in Mj are taller than those in Mi, and their partners,
who make up the set Wj, are taller than the women in Wi. If the partition of P
becomes finer (i.e. if we further stratify one or more of the strata of P ) then clearlyer increases further. The finest possible partition has q = n; in this case, and whether
or not the sets M and W are overlapping, the ith tallest man matches with the ith
tallest women, so sorting is perfectly positive.
In order to quantify the eﬀects of stratification we return to the case where
height is evenly distributed and n tends to infinity. This allows us to take advan-
tage of and extend the results already derived, and in particular to analyse the
characteristics of the optimal stratification (which for a given q maximises er). We
focus on two cases: (i) when M and W do not overlap, but q varies; (ii) where M
and W do overlap, and q = 2. We now establish some preliminary results.
However height is distributed and whatever the value of n, if P is partitioned
into q strata then we can decompose the correlation coeﬃcient er into q + 1 parts:
er = qX
i=1
ωir
∗
i +
Cov(mi, wi)
[V ar(M)V ar(W )]0.5
,
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where
ωi =
ni
n
[V ar(Mi)V ar(Wi)]
0.5
[V ar(M)V ar(W )]0.5
,
Cov(mi, wi) =
qX
i=1
ni
n
(mi −m) (wi − w¯) ,
mi =
1
ni
X
mj∈Mi
mj and wi =
1
ni
X
wj∈Wi
wj.
We now let n tend to infinity, with the relative size of each stratum tending to a given
proportion of the population: for i = 1, ...q, as n →∞, we assume that ni/n→ νi,
where
Pq
i νi = 1.Within each stratum, the matching µ
∗
i will change as ni increases;
but if height is evenly distributed within M and W , with parameters m, w, sm,
and sw, then as n tends to infinity (i) V ar(M) and V ar(W ) tend to (sm)
2 /12 and
(sw)
2 /12 respectively; (ii) V ar(Mi) and V ar(Wi) tend to (νism)
2 /12 and (νisw)
2 /12
respectively for all i; (iii) the correlation coeﬃcient r∗i will tend to a limit ρi = f(σ,
∆i) where f(., .) is given by equation (4), and ∆i = Limn→∞ (mi − wi) / (νism)
= νi
−1
n
∆+ (1− σ)(
Pi−1
j νj − (1− νi)/2)
o
. Thus as n tends to infinity, er tends to
eρ =Xq
i=1
νi
3ρi + x, (13)
where x = 12Limn→∞Cov(mi,wi)
smsw
. For any n, Cov(mi, wi) depends on n1,n2, , ...nq,
but not on the matching eµ (which aﬀects sorting within strata but not the strata
means or their covariance). The value of x is thus easily derived: if we consider the
(typically non-equilibrium) matching that produces perfect positive sorting, then
for any value of n each ri equals 1, as well as the overall correlation coeﬃcient r;
i.e. 1 =
Pq
i=1 ωi + 12
Cov(mi,wi)
smsw
. Taking limits, we see that x = 1 −
Pq
i=1 νi
3 and
substituting into (13) we have:
eρ = 1−Xq
i=1
νi
3(1− ρi)
If the strata are of equal size, then νi = 1/q for all i and eρ = 1− q−2 + q−3Pqi=1 ρi.
This is bounded below by 1 − 2q−2, which tends to 1 as q tends to infinity. Thus
the population can get arbitrarily close to the welfare maximum by a fine enough
stratification.
4.2.1 Optimal stratification when M and W do not overlap
If M and W do not overlap then neither do Mi and Wi, so each µi is a type 1
matching. Thus as n→∞, ri tends to −1 for all i andeρ = 1− 2Xq
i=1
νi
3.
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Finer stratification increases eρ, since ν3i + ν3j < (νi+ vj)3 for νi and υj both strictly
between 0 and 1. For fixed q, eρ is maximised when νi = 1/q for all i. In this
case, eρ = 1− 2/q2, the lower bound referred to above. For q = 1, eρ equals −1 and
it approaches 1 only as q increases without bound. Thus the welfare maximum is
attainable only by an infinitely fine stratification of the population. However, note
that having only two strata increases eρ from −1 to 1
2
.13
4.2.2 Optimal stratification when q = 2
Regardless of whether M and W overlap or not, when q = 2 and height is evenly
distributed, then as n tends to infinity er tends to
eρ = 1− ν13(1− ρ1)− ν23(1− ρ2). (14)
If M and W overlap, then the values of ρ1 and ρ2 depend on the nature and extent
of overlap and the relative size of the two strata. For example, it is possible that
most but not all women are shorter than all men; then if ν1 is close to 12 , M1 and
W2 overlap, but not M1 and W1, or M2 and W2. Then the unrestricted µ is a type
2 matching but eµ1 and eµ2 are both type 1 matchings with ρ1 = ρ2 = −1. But if ν1
is large enough, M1 and W1 do overlap and ρ1 > −1. In general, ρ1 and ρ2 depend
on the distribution parameters, m, w, sm, and sw, and the stratification, which for
q = 2 can be represented by the value of ν1. More precisely, ρi = f(σ, ∆i) where
∆i = (mi − wi) / (ν1sm) and f(., .) is given by equation (4). Note that
∆1 =
∆
ν1
− (1− σ) (1− ν1)
2ν1
(15)
and
∆2 =
∆
(1− ν1)
+
(1− σ) ν1
2 (1− ν1)
(16)
We can combine (4), (14), (15), and (??) to express eρ as a function g(ν1;σ,
∆). From this we can derive the optimal stratification correspondence K(σ,∆) =
{η|η = argmax0≤ν1≤1 g(ν1;σ,∆)} and the maximised correlation function h(σ,∆) =
max0≤ν1≤1 g(ν1;σ, ∆). The main properties of g(ν1;σ, ∆), K(σ, ∆) and h(σ, ∆)
are set out in the three propositions below, with the formal analysis in Appendix 2.
Proposition 8 g(ν1;σ, ∆) ≥ f(σ, ∆) for all 0 < ν1 < 1
13This is reminiscent of McAfee’s (2002) result that rationing electricity using two priority classes
realises 75% of the value of using infiniteley many classes, the latter being first best but possibly
administratively infeasible.
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Proposition 9 (i) If ∆ 6= 0, K(σ, ∆) has a single element which is a
continuous function k(σ, ∆) such that (a) if 0 < σ < 1 and 0 < |∆| < 0.5, then
k(σ, ∆) is strictly decreasing in |∆| ; (b) if |∆| ≥ 0.5 or if σ = 1 then k(σ, ∆) = 0.5;
(c) k(σ, ∆) + k(σ, −∆) = 1.
(ii) if ∆ = 0 and 0 < σ < 1, then K(σ, ∆) =
nbk(σ), 1− bk(σ)o, where bk(σ) =
Lim k(σ, ∆) as ∆ → 0 from above, bk(σ) is increasing in σ, Limσ→0bk(σ) = 34 and
Limσ→1bk(σ) = 56 ;
(iii) if ∆ = 0, and σ = 1, K(σ, ∆) = {v1|0 ≤ ν1 ≤ 1}.
Proposition 10 h(σ, ∆) is a continuous function such that (i) h(σ, ∆) = h(σ,
−∆); (ii) h(σ, ∆) = 0.5 if |∆| > 1
2
; (iii) h(σ, ∆) > 0.5 if |∆| < 1
2
;(iii) h(σ, ∆) = 1
if and only if ∆ = 0 and σ = 1; (iv) for ∆ = 0, h(σ, ∆) is increasing in σ;(v) for
σ < 1, h(σ, ∆)is increasing in |∆| in a neighbourhood of ∆ = 0;
Proposition 8 states that some stratification is never welfare reducing, even if
the strata are of very diﬀerent sizes. To understand how K(σ, ∆), the optimal
stratification, and h(σ, ∆), the consequent correlation coeﬃcient, depend on the
underlying paramenters take two distributions that initially do not overlap because
∆ ≥ 1+σ
2
, and consider the eﬀects of reducing ∆ keeping σ constant at some value
less than 1. With no overlap between M and W , and with q = 2, eρ is maximised
when ν1 = ν2 = 0.5. If 0.5 ≤ ∆ < 1+σ2 , then as ν1 increases from 0 to 1, the matching
types of µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 are (1, 2) respectively, then (1, 1) then (2, 1). The first and third
of these would increase the correlation coeﬃcient of one of the submatchings to a
value more than −1, and have some eﬀect on x = 1−ν13−ν23. By contrast, choosing
ν1 = ν2 = 0.5 would mean that although µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 were both type 1 matchings,
with correlation coeﬃcients equal to −1, x would attain its highest possible value
of 3
4
. It is this eﬀect that dominates, so k(σ, ∆) = h(σ, ∆) = 0.5. The optimal
stratification when ∆ = 0.5 and σ = 1 is illustrated in Figure 11.14
As ∆ falls below 0.5, choosing ν1 = 0.5 would mean that µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 were type 2
and type 1 matchings respectively, so r∗1 > −1 = r∗2; it now becomes worthwhile to
increase the size of the better matched stratum (P1) and thus to reduce some of the
more extreme mismatches in P2; hence k(σ, ∆) > 0.5. As ∆ falls further, the benefit
of having diﬀerently sized strata increases, even up to the point where ∆ = 0. In
14Because σ = 1, the unstratified matching µ∗ has a discontinuity. In the region of overlap
between M and W all men and women find an identical partmer, so the middle section apparent
in Figure 5 has zero weight.
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Figure 11: The optimal stratification when ∆ = 0.5 and σ = 1 has ν1 = 0.5
this case, the unrestricted matching µ∗ has the shorter half ofM matching with the
shorter half of W , so a symmetric stratification with ν1 = 0.5 would not increase
welfare at all; any benefit from stratification can only be gained by having strata of
diﬀerent sizes. For ∆ = 0 it would not matter whether P1 or P2 were the larger; the
function g(σ, 0, ν1) is symmetric around ν1 = 0.5, achieving a minimum of f(σ, 0)
at ν1 = 0, 0.5, or 1, and a maximum of h(σ, 0) at ν1 = bk(σ) or ν2 = bk(σ). If ∆ is
positive then the balance is in favour of having a larger P1 than P2. If ∆ is negative,
the balance is reversed; there is thus a discontinuity in the optimal stratification at
∆ = 0. As ∆ approaches −0.5, so the optimal size of P2 falls, with 1 − ν∗1 getting
closer to 0.5, and staying there for∆ < −0.5. Figure 12 illustrates how the behaviour
of how the optimal stratification varies with ∆ for σ = 0.001, 0.5, and 0.99. It may
be sumarised thus: if the sex that is the more varied in height is also on average the
taller (e.g. sm > sw and m > w), then there will be a relatively large stratum of
short people (v1 > 0.5) and a smaller stratum of tall people (v2 < 0.5). 15
Two special cases are worth mentioning. If∆ 6= 0 then as σ → 1, k(σ, ∆)→ 0.5
and if σ = 1 then k(σ, ∆) = 0.5; so the benefits of diﬀerently sized strata only exist
if one sex is more varied in characteristics. Secondly, and in apparent contradiction
to the first case, if ∆ = 0, then as σ increases the optimal size of the larger stratum,
15For σ = 1 and ∆ 6= 0, k(σ,∆) = 0.5, and for σ = 1 and ∆ = 1 any stratification is optimal.
Thus for σ = 1 the graph of v1∗ against ∆ would coincide with the two lines v1∗ = 0 and ∆ = 0.
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Figure 12: The optimal stratification as a function of ∆.
bk(σ), increases with σ, and tends to 5
6
as σ approaches 1. But in this second case
the benefits of any stratification are reduced as σ approaches 1, since a correlation
coeﬃcient of 1+σ
2
can be achieved by an unstratified matching. If ∆ = 0 and σ = 1,
then g(ν1;σ, ∆) = 1 for any value of ν1, including ν1 = 0.5.
Part (v) of Proposition 10 is perhaps somewhat counterintuitive. With an
unstratified matching, welfare increases as |∆| decreases, as 4 and Figure 9 show.
By contrast, with an optimally chosen stratification and when∆ is close to zero, this
is not the case unless σ = 1. Compared to ∆ = 0, a slight diﬀerence in the means
of the two distributions actually reduces the cost of having diﬀerently sized strata,
but at the margin it shifts the balance in favour of reducing the size of the larger
stratum. However, for larger values of |∆|, further increases are welfare reducing.
This is illustrated in Figure 13, which shows how the optimised correlation coeﬃcient
varies with ∆ for σ = 0.001, 0.5, and 1.
4.2.3 Social Stratification
The results above show that a constraint on who can match with whom can have
benefits in terms of welfare or aggregate payoﬀ. We have taken utility functions
with a particular form, but the essential assumption is that individuals experience
an increasing marginal disutility from being badly matched. A welfare function with
an aversion to inequality in individual utilities would reinforce the benefits of strat-
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Figure 13: The correlation coeﬃcient as a function h(σ,∆) when the stratification
is optimal.
ification. Since the unrestricted matching is Pareto eﬃcient, a stratified matching
secures a welfare improvement only by reducing the utility of some individuals. For
example, in the case where all men are taller than all women, it forbids the matching
of the tallest woman and the shortest man; instead, the tallest woman matches with
the median man, and the shortest man with the median woman.
It is important to bear in mind that agents are horizontally not vertically diﬀer-
entiated (despite taking height as our main example of heterogeneity), and for the
same partner taller individuals are not necessarily better oﬀ than shorter ones. It
would therefore be quite wrong to interpret the strata as “upper class” and “lower
class”. Rather, it suggests the notion of strata as equally valued and possibly equally
well-oﬀ communities, with matching only occurring within communities; we might
call this “horizontal” stratification. It has important diﬀerences from the “verti-
cal” stratification considered by some writers. For example, Durlauf (1996a) studies
stratification when agents segregate into neighbourhoods according to income and
education. Kremer and Maskin (1996) examine segregation of high and low skill
workers into separate firms. Durlauf and Seshadri (2001) have a general model of
coalition formation; in a stratified allocation, for any two coalitions all the members
of one are more productive than all the members of the other. Economies with such
diﬀerences almost inevitably have inequalities of income, and the focus of many of
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these studies is not inequality per se but how it is perpetuated by stratification, as
in Benabou (1993) or (Durlauf, 1996a). This is in sharp contrast to the analysis
presented here, which shows that stratification reduces inequalities in utility and
increases welfare.
In the studies cited above vertical stratification arises endogenously, whereas in
this paper, the mechanism by which constraints on matching arise is not explicitly
modelled. The simplest justification for this is that stratification may arise as the
result of technologically determined constraints on interaction due, for example, to
transport costs or non-existent channels of communication. Then technical progress,
by breaking down the barriers between communities, may reduce stratification and
possibly bring about a fall in social welfare.
Alternatively, some problems of sorting arise in organisations where constraints
on matching are explicit objects of choice. For example, corporate divisionalisation
may make some working practices (e.g. pairings of workers) impossible and others
easier.16 The way in which a university is organised may encourage some forms
of collaboration and discourage others. In some constitutional structures, such as
devolution or federalism, the smaller political unit often has the power to impose
constraints which amount to stratification; for example, the professional qualifica-
tions of teachers or lawyers may allow them to practise only in the region or state
where they trained. By inhibiting mobility, such restrictions are sometimes regarded
as welfare reducing. The analysis here suggests a case for the opposite.17
But even if stratification is not a technological fact of life or a policy vari-
able, over time social pressures, norms, conventions, and sanctions might develop
that would enforce a stratification. Indeed, such forces could be incorporated into
agents’ preferences, so that only “deviants” and not “normal people” would want
to match with someone outside their own community. Taking this line of reasoning
further, recall that the analysis shows that one of the reasons that stratification is
welfare enhancing is that utility is not transferable. If utility is fully transferable and
matched partners are faced with a utility possibility set such that um+uw = φ(m,w),
where φ is supermodular, then the population will sort positively and achieve max-
imum welfare. Legros and Newman (2003) have argued that economy-wide changes
in the degree of transferability may help to explain changes in matching patterns.
16On corporate structure as a matching problem, see Legros and Newman (2003).
17More generally, we may think of various forms of associational redistribution discussed, for
example, by Durlauf (1996b), as imposing a stratification to replace or improve that which arises
endogenously.
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If it is the case that the liberalisation of markets, deregulation, or the increased
availability of credit, for example, have made utility more transferable, then there
is less pressure for a stratification that constrains permissable partnerships, with a
consequent weakening in the importance of community and social conventions.18
5 Concluding Remarks
Matching and sorting arise in many instances of social and economic activity. In
some of these areas, it might be appropriate to assume that all participants on one
side of the market agree on how to rank the participants on the other; in this case the
matching equilibrium is unique and is characterised by positive sorting. But there
are many situations where agents have diﬀerent tastes, and where they would prefer
to match with someone who has similar characteristics, i.e. where like attracts like.
In this case the nature of the outcome is far from obvious. This paper show that
when like attracts like there is a unique stable matching, but that there is no reason
to expect it to display positive assortment. The degree of assortment depends on the
distribution of characteristics among the two sides of the matching market. Where
there is an overlap we will find couples who are well suited to reach other. But when
such “fixed pairs” have been matched we may well be left with a sub-population
where many agents prefer the same partner, who in turn may prefer someone else.
By taking characteristics to be evenly, and in the limit uniformly, distributed this
paper isolates the average mismatch between men and women, measured by |∆| ,
as the key determinant of assortment. The lower is |∆|, the greater is the degree of
positive assortment.
By taking particular forms for the social welfare and utility functions, the paper
shows that assortment - and hence welfare - can be increased by restrictions on
matching. If matching occurs only within strata then in general the utility of some
couples will be lower than it would otherwise be, but this is more than oﬀset by
the increase in the utility of others who would otherwise be in extreme mismatches.
The analysis shows that if there are two strata, and they are chosen or have evolved
optimally, then they will not necessarily be of equal size. If the sex that is taller on
average is also the varied in height (e.g. for m > w if sm > sw), then there will be
18But note that if agents are vertically not horizontally diﬀerentiated, then with non-transferable
utility the population sorts positively, even with no constraints on matching. The assumption of
“like attracts like” is central to the hypothesis that increased transferability reduces the need for
stratification.
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a relatively large stratum of short people and a smaller stratum of tall people.
This paper makes a number of important assumptions. These have delivered
a tractable model and reasonably simple results, but the consequences of relaxing
them remain to be explored. Two extensions of the model are worth a brief men-
tion. Firstly, more general distributions of characteristics will produce a much wider
variety of matching patterns than Types 1, 2, and 3. Nevertheless, the equilibrium
matching can always be found by identifying the fixed pairs of sucessively smaller
sub-populations. For the population P, it will still be in the regions of overlap be-
tween the two distributions that fixed pairs will be found. Since the fixed pairs of P
sort positively, the extent of overlap will be an important determinant of the degree
of sorting. However, it seems likely that a simple characterisation of ρ similar to
equation (4) will only be available in special cases.19
Secondly, I have assumed that utility is absolutely non-transferable, so sorting
is determined by the distribution of characteristics. At the other extreme of full
transferability, sorting depends on the modularity of the function φ(m,w) giving
the utilities of two matched individuals. This therefore leaves open the question
of what happens to matching and sorting as the degree of transferability increases.
For example, if φ is supermodular and the distributions of m and w do not overlap,
then as we move from non- to full transferability, sorting will change from negative
to positive. Investigating the properties of that transition is an interesting area for
further research.
19Furthermore, it is only in the case of even or uniform distributions that the monotonicity of a
matching, as measured by the the rank correlation Λ, coincides with the correlation coeﬃcient r.
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APPENDIX 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Each person in P has complete, reflexive, transitive
and strict preferences over members of the opposite sex and would rather be married
to anyone than remain single. The problem thus meets the conditions for existence
set out in Gale and Shapley, (1962).
Proof of Proposition 2. The population P satisfies the No Crossing Con-
dition, as defined in Clark (2002), and so Theorem 2 in Clark (2002) applies.
Proof of Proposition 3. (a) (i) For each man m ∈ MZ, consider the open
interval Zm = {z|m − dm/2 < z < m + dm/2}. As MZ excludes the shortest and
tallest elements of MZ, the shortest and tallest elements of MZ must be at least a
distance dm from x and y respectively, so Zm ⊂ Z. Consider θ(m), m’s preferred
woman in W. Since dm > dw, Zm must contain at least one element of W , hence
θ(m) ∈ Zm.Furthermore, Zm is open and thus does not contain its boundary points,
so γ(w) = m for any woman w ∈ Zm, since she is less than a distance dm/2 from m
and more than dm from any other man. Hence m = γ(θ(m)), so m and θ(m) ∈ Zm
are a fixed pair and are therefore matched in equilibrium. Since θ(m) ∈ Zm and
Zm ⊂ Z, then θ(m) ∈ Z; but θ(m) ∈W , so θ(m) ∈W ∩Z =WZ .(ii) Let {ew, em} be
a pair such that ew ∈ WZ and em /∈MZ . Then either em < x, in which case em would
prefer minv∈WZ v (the shortest element of WZ) to ew, or em > y, in which case em
would prefer maxv∈WZ v (the tallest element of WZ) to ew. In either case, θ(em) 6= ew,
so {ew, em} cannot be a fixed pair of P . Hence if ew is a member of a fixed pair {ew,bm}, then bm ∈MZ .
(b) If women are sparse in Z, the proof of (a) applies, mutatis mutandis.
(c) Suppose now that dm = dw = d. We write MZ and WZ in order as {mz1,
mz2, ..., m
z
q} and {wz1, wz2, ..., wr} respectively, where q = #MZ and r = #WZ . If
mz1 = w
z
1 then q = r andm
z
i equals and hence pairs with w
z
i for i = 1, 2, ...q.To prove
part (i) If mz1 6= wz1, then for any man inMZ there exist men m and m, both inMZ ,
and women w and w, both in WZ, such that m < w < m < w < m. There are now
two possibilities: (A) m is equidistant between w and w, w is equi-distant between
m and m, and w is equi-distant between m and m. We have assumed that faced
with two equidistant members of the opposite sex women prefer the taller man and
men prefer the shorter woman, so {m, w} is a fixed pair. (B) If men and women are
not equi-distant in the sense described in (A) above then m’s preferred woman in
P , θ(m), who must be w or w, is strictly less than d/2 in distance from m. Thus m
is also the nearest man to θ(m) so m = γ(θ(m)) i.e.{m, θ(m)}is a fixed pair.As for
part (ii), for any woman in WZ there exist women w and w, both in WZ , and men
m and m, both inMZ, such that w < m < w < m < w. Then the same argument as
for (i), mutatis mutandis, establishes that {γ(w), w} is a fixed pair with γ(w) equal
either to m or m.
Proof of Proposition 4. We provide a proof for the case where δ ≥ 1. The
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proof when δ ≤ 1 follows mutatis mutandis (i). By parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition
3 π(MZ) = 1 for any dm, dw such that dm/dw ≥ 1. By definition, #MZ = #MZ+2,
(where #(S) denotes the number of elements in the set S), so π(MZ) ≥ #MZ−2#MZ . As
dm → 0, #MZ → ∞, so π(MZ)→ 1. (ii) From Proposition 3, (a)(i) and(c)(i) each
man in MZ is in a fixed pair of P with some woman in WZ . Thus the number of
women in WZ who are in fixed pairs is at least #(MZ) and the number of women
in WZ who are in fixed pairs is at least #(MZ) − 2. From Proposition 3 (a)(iii)
and (c)(iii) any woman in WZ who is a member of a fixed pair of P is matched in
equilibrium with a man in MZ, so the number of women in WZ who are in fixed
pairs can be no greater than #(MZ). Dividing these lower and upper bounds by
#(WZ), we have
#(MZ)−2
#(WZ)
≤ π(WZ) ≤ #(MZ)#(WZ) . But for any values of dm and dw,
(y − x)/dm − 4 ≤ #(MZ) − 2 < #(MZ) ≤ (y − x)/dm + 1 and (y − x)/dw − 4 ≤
#(WZ) ≤ (y − x)/dw − 1 so ≤ (y−x)/dm−4(y−x)/dw−1 ≤ π(WZ) ≤
(y−x)/dm+1
(y−x)/dw−4 . As dm and dw
tend to zero with dw/dm = δ, these upper and lower bounds to π(WZ) both tend to
δ, as does therefore π(WZ). A similar argument establishes that
#(MZ)
#(WZ)
≤ π(WZ) ≤
#(MZ)+2
#(WZ)
, that (y−x)/dm−2
(y−x)/dw+1 ≤ π(WZ) ≤
(y−x)/dm+3
(y−x)/dw−2 , and hence that π(WZ) tends to δ.
Proof of Proposition 5. We assume without loss of generality that δ ≤ 1.
The proof when δ ≥ 1 follows mutatis mutandis. If δ ≤ 1 and {m, w} is a fixed pair
such that m ∈ Mz then |m − w| ≤ dm/2. We exploit this to put lower and upper
bounds on r(MZ), both of which converge to 1. For any dm, we can write r(MZ) as
r(MZ) =
P
mi∈S(mi(mi ± dm2 )− m¯S(m¯S ± dm2 )©P
mi∈S(m
2
i − (m¯S)
2 ×Pmi∈S[(mi ± dm2 )2 − (m¯S ± dm2 )2]ª0.5 (17)
where the notation a± dm
2
means that a lies between a− dm
2
and a+ dm
2
. Taking the
highest and lowest values of r(MZ) that satisfy eq.(17), and rearrangingP
mi∈S{(mi2 − m¯S2)− m¯Sdm}©P
mi∈S(mi
2 − m¯S2)× {
P
mi∈S[(mi
2 − m¯S2) + 2mi + dm
2
2
}ª0.5
≤ r(MZ)
≤
P
mi∈S{(mi2 − m¯S2) + m¯Sdm}©P
mi∈S(mi
2 − m¯S2)× {
P
mi∈S[(mi
2 − m¯S2)− 2mi − dm
2
2
}ª0.5
Dividing by #MZ,
V ar(m,S)− m¯Sdm
{[V ar(m,S)]2 + [V ar(m,S)× (2m¯Sdm + dm22 )}0.5
≤ r(MZ)
≤ V ar(m,S) + m¯Sdm{[V ar(m,S)]2 − [V ar(m,S)× (2m¯Sdm + dm22 )}0.5
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As dm → 0, it is simple to show thatmS → (x+y)/2, and V ar(m, S)→ (x−y)2/12,
(the variance of a uniform distribution on [x, y] ) Thus r(MZ) itself converges to 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. The statement of the Lemma clearly defines µ0 as a
matching of P 0. Then we need to show that µ0 cannot be blocked by any pair (m,
w) ∈ M0 × W0 such that m 6= µ0(w). Clearly µ0 cannot be blocked by any pair
(m, w) ∈ M2 ×W2, as this would imply that µ∗2 was not a stable matching of P2;
similarly, µ0 cannot be blocked by any pair (m, w) ∈ M3×W3, as this would imply
that µ∗3 was not a stable matching of P3. Therefore if a pair (m, w) can block µ
0,
either (i) (m, w) ∈ M2 ×W3 or (ii). (m, w) ∈ M3 ×W2. If (i), then m ∈ M2
prefers w ∈ W3 to θ(m) ∈ W2; this is a contradiction, since all women in W2 are
nearer to all men in M2 than all women in W3. If (ii), then m ∈ M3 prefers w ∈W2
to θ(m) ∈ W3; this is a contradiction, since all women in W3 are nearer to all men
in M3 than all women in W2. Thus µ0 cannot be blocked and is therefore stable.
Proof of Proposition 6. As a preliminary, note that since n1/n is the
proportion of men who are between m1 = m− sm/2 and wn = w + sw/2 in height
and n3/n is the proportion of women who are between w1 = w − sw/2 and m1 =
m− sm/2, then as n→∞,


n1/n)
n2/n)
n3/n)

→


w−m+ 1
2
(sm+sw))
sm
(sm−sw)(w−m+12 (sm+sw))
smsw
m−w− 1
2
(sm−sw)
sw

 , denoted by


υ1
υ2
υ3

 .
1. the limiting behaviour of µ∗1. As n → ∞, both dw and dm tend to 0. But
dw/dm = sw/sm for all n, so we may apply Propositions 4 and 5 with δ = sw/sm ≤ 1.
In the limit, the men in [m1, wn] are matched with a proportion sw/sm of the women
in [m1, wn], with a correlation coeﬃcient between men and their partners’ heights
of 1; i.e. in the limit r(M1) = 1.
2. the limiting behaviour of µ∗2. For any n, the sets M2 and W2 match with
perfect negative assortment, so the enth shortest man in M2 matches with the enth
tallest woman in W2. In the limit M2 ranges from w¯ + sw/2 to w¯ + sw/2 + smυ2;
but for any n, male height within M2 is distributed evenly, so in the limit for any
fraction π˜ less than 1, the shortest π˜ of the men in M2 range from w¯ + sw/2 to
w¯ + sw/2 + πsmυ2. From Proposition 4 π(WZ) (the limiting proportion of women
in the interval Z = [m¯ − sm/2, w¯ + sw/2] who are in a fixed pair of P and thus
in W1) is δ = sw/sm; this leaves a proportion 1 − sw/sm of the women in Z who
are in W2. But Proposition 4 can be applied to any interval of the real line within
which male and female height is evenly distributed with a given ratio δ = dw/dm,
so that that for any interval Z 0 ⊂ [m¯− sm/2, w¯ + sw/2], in the limit a proportion
1− sw/sm of the women in Z 0 are in W2. Thus the height of women in W2 is evenly
distributed, but in general only in the limit. Since in the limit W2 ranges from
m¯−sm/2 to w¯+sw/2, this implies that the tallest π˜ of the women inW2 range from
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w¯+sw/2− π˜(w¯−m¯+(sw+sm)/2) to w¯+sw/2. Thus a man of height wn+πsmυ2 is
matched with a woman of height w¯+ sw/2− π˜(w¯− m¯+(sw + sm)/2). Recalling the
expression for υ2 above, this means that the limiting behaviour of the sub-matching
µ2 is characterised by a linear relationship µ
∗(m) = a− bm where b = sm
sm−sw , which
implies a correlation coeﬃcient between men and their partners’ heights of -1; i.e.
in the limit r(M2) = −1.
3. the limiting behaviour of µ∗3.For any n, male height is distributed evenly
within M3 with a diﬀerence between succesively taller men of dm = sm/(n − 1);
similarly female height is distributed evenly within W3 with a diﬀerence between
succesively taller women of dw = sw/(n−1). These two sets sort perfectly negatively,
so for any n the behaviour of the sub-matching µ∗3 is characterised by a linear
relationship µ∗(m) = a − bm where b = sm
sw
, which implies a correlation coeﬃcient
between men and their partners’ heights of -1; i.e. r(M3) = −1.
Now, for any n
r =
3X
i=1
ωir(Mi) +
Cov(mi, wi)
[V ar(M)V ar(W )]0.5
, (18)
where
ωi =
ni
n
[V ar(Mi)V ar(Wi)]
0.5
[V ar(M)V ar(W )]0.5
,
Cov(mi, wi) =
3X
i=1
ni
n
(mi −m) (wi − w¯) ,
mi =
1
ni
X
mj∈Mi
mj and wi =
1
ni
X
wj∈Wi
wj.
Within the sets M and W height is evenly distributed for any value of n. Thus as
n → ∞, V ar(M) → sm2
12
and V ar(W ) → sw2
12
.Within the sets M1, M2,M3, and W3
height is evenly distributed for any value of n. The discussion above of µ2 showed
that the height of women in W2 is evenly distributed, but in general only in the
limit. A similar argument applies to W1. Therefore as n→∞,


m1
m2
m3
w1
w2
w3


→


2(m¯+w¯)+sw−sm
4
w + sw+υ2sm
2
m¯+ sm(1−υ2)
2
2(m¯+w¯)+sw−sm
4
2(m¯+w¯)+sw−sm
4
2(m¯+w¯)−sw−sm
4


and


V ar(M1)
V ar(M2)
V ar(M3)
V ar(W1)
V ar(W2)
V ar(W3)


→


(υ1sm)2
12
(υ2sm)2
12
(υ3sm)2
12
(υ1sm)2
12
(υ1sm)2
12
(υ3sw)2
12


.
These limits all exist and are finite. Since the limits of r(M1), r(M2), and r(M3),
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are 1, −1, and −1 respectively, then as n→∞, r → r∗ where
r∗ = υ1
(υ1sm)
2
smsw
− υ2
(υ2sm)(υ1sm)
smsw
− υ3
(υ3sm)(υ3sw)
smsw
+{υ1 (2(m¯+ w¯) + sw − sm)
16
2
+υ2
(2w + sw+υ2sm)(2(m¯+ w¯) + sw − sm)
8
+υ3
(2m¯+ sm(1− υ2))(2(m¯+ w¯)− sw − sm)
8
−mw¯}/smsw
12
This boils down to
r∗ = 2
µ
sm
sw
¶2
(
sm + sw
2sm
− m¯− w¯
sm
)3 − 1 (19)
Proof of Proposition 7. Equation 18 still applies, but we must recompute
its constituent parts, As a preliminary, note that since n1/n is the proportion of
men who are between w1 = w − sw/2 and wn = w + sw/2 in height , n2/n is the
proportion of women who are between w1 = w−sw/2 andm1 = m−sm/2, and n3/n
is the proportion of women who are between wn = w + sw/2 and mn = m+ sm/2,
then as n→∞,


n1/n)
n2/n)
n3/n)

→


sw
sm
2(w−m)+sm−sw
2sm
2(m−w)+sm−sw
2sm

 , which we denote by


υ1
υ2
υ3

 .
1. the limiting behaviour of µ∗1.As n → ∞, both dw and dm tend to 0. But
dw/dm = sw/sm for all n, so we may apply Propositionss 4 and 5 with δ = sw/sm ≤ 1.
In the limit, the men in [w1, wn] are matched with a proportion sw/sm of the women
in [w1, wn], with a correlation coeﬃcient between men and their partners’ heights
of 1; i.e. in the limit r(M1) = 1.
2. the limiting behaviour of µ∗2.For any n, the sets M2 and W2 match with
perfect negative assortment, so the enth tallest man in M2 matches with the enth
shortest woman in W2. In the limit M2 ranges from m¯− sm/2 to w¯ − sw/2; but for
any n, male height within M2 is distributed evenly, so in the limit for any fraction
π˜, the tallest π˜ of the men in M2 range from w¯ − sw/2− π˜(w¯ − m¯ + (sm − sw)/2)
to w¯ − sw/2. From Proposition 4 π(WZ), the limiting proportion of women in the
interval Z = [m¯ − sm/2, m¯ + sm/2] who are in a fixed pair of P (and thus in W1)
is δ = sw/sm; this leaves a proportion 1 − sw/sm of the women in Z who are in
W0, and hence either W2 or W3. But Proposition 4 can be applied to any interval of
the real line within which male and female height is evenly distributed with a given
ratio δ = dw/dm, so that that for any interval Z 0 ⊂ Z in the limit proportions sw/sm
and 1− sw/sm of the women in Z 0 are in W1 and W0 respectively. Thus in the limit
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the height of women in W0, and hence of those inW2 and W3, is evenly distributed.
SinceW0 ranges from w¯−sw/2 to w¯+sw/2, this implies that in the limitW2 ranges
from w¯− sw/2 to w¯− sw/2 + υ2υ3 sw, the shortest π˜ of whom range from w¯− sw/2 to
w¯−sw/2+ π˜ υ2υ2+υ3 sw. A man of height w¯−sw/2− π˜(w¯−m¯+(sm−sw)/2) is therefore
matched with a woman of height w¯ − sw/2 + π˜ υ2υ2+υ3 sw. Recalling the expressions
for υ2 and υ2 above, this means that the limiting behaviour of the sub-matching
µ2 is characterised by a linear relationship µ(m) = a− bm where b = swsm−sw , which
implies a correlation coeﬃcient between men and their partners’ heights of -1; i.e.
in the limit r(M2) = −1.
3. the limiting behaviour of µ∗3.The argument here follows that regarding µ2
almost exactly. In the limit, a man of height w¯+ sw/2+ π˜(m¯− w¯+ (sm− sw)/2) is
matched with a woman of height w¯+sw/2− π˜ υ3υ2+υ3 sw. Therefore µ2 is characterised
by a linear relationship µ(m) = a − bm where b = sw
sm−sw , implying a correlation
coeﬃcient between men and their partners’ heights of -1; i.e. in the limit r(M2) =
−1.
Now, within the sets M and W height is evenly distributed for any value of
n. Thus as n → ∞, V ar(M) → sm2
12
and V ar(W ) → sw2
12
.Within the sets M1, M2,
and M3, height is evenly distributed for any value of n. The discussion above of µ2
showed that the height of women in W1, W2 and W3 is evenly distributed, but in
general only in the limit. Therefore as n→∞


m1
m2
m3
w1
w2
w3


→


w¯
2(m¯+w¯)−sw−sm
4
2(m¯+w¯)+sw+sm
4
w¯
w¯ − υ3smsw
2(sm−sw)
w¯ + υ2smsw
2(sm−sw)


and


V ar(M1)
V ar(M2)
V ar(M3)
V ar(W1)
V ar(W2)
V ar(W3)


→


sw
2
(υ2sm)
2
(υ3sm)
2
sw
2
( υ1υ2
sm−sw )
2
( υ1υ3
sm−sw )
2


÷ 12.
These limits all exist and are finite. Since the limits of r(M1), r(M2), and r(M3)
are 1, −1, and −1 respectively, then as n→∞, r → r∗ where
r∗ = υ1
sw
2
smsw
− υ2
(υ2sm)(υ1υ2)
smsw(sm − sw)
− υ3
(υ3sm)(υ1υ3)
smsw(sm − sw)
+{υ1w¯2
+υ2
(2(m¯+ w¯)(sm − sw)− sm2 + sw2) (4w¯(sm − sw)− 2υ3smsw)
4(sm − sw)
+υ3
(2(m¯+ w¯)(sm − sw) + sm2 − sw2) (4w¯(sm − sw) + 2υ2smsw)
4(sm − sw)
−m¯w¯} ÷ smsw
12
Again, this expression simplifies, and
r∗ =
sm + sw
2sm
− 6 (m¯− w¯)
2
sm (sm − sw)
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APPENDIX 2: properties of the optimal stratification
1. µ∗ is a type 1 matching: 1+σ
2
≤ |∆|
In this case, whatever the value of ν1 neither M1 and W1, nor M2 and W2,
overlap, so ρ1 = ρ2 = −1, eρ = 1 − 2ν13 − 2ν23 and ν∗1 = 12 . If the strata were of
diﬀerent sizes the larger stratum would involve some extreme mismatches, which
would not be oﬀset by the closer matches in the smaller stratum.
2. µ∗ is a type 2 matching: 1−σ
2
≤ |∆| < 1+σ
2
2.1 σ 6= 1
We focus on the case where ∆ > 0. The case where ∆ < 0 is symmetric. We
consider two possibilities:
2.1.1 1+σ
2
2(1+σ)
≤ ∆ < 1+σ
2
Combining 4, 14, 15, and ??we see that as ν1 increases from 0 to 1, the matching
types of µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 are (1, 2) respectively, then (1, 1), then (2, 1). More precisely,
g(ν1;σ, ∆) =



6ν1 (1− ν1)− 1 + 2σ−2
¡
1+σ
2
− v1 −∆
¢3
if 0 ≤ ν1 ≤ 1+σ2 −∆
6ν1 (1− ν1)− 1 if 1+σ2 −∆ < ν1 <
∆
σ
− 1−σ
2σ
6ν1 (1− ν1)− 1 + 2σ−2
¡
σν1 −∆+ 1−σ2
¢3
if ∆
σ
− 1−σ
2σ
< ν1 ≤ 1.
(20)
If ν1 = 0 or 1, then g(ν1;σ, ∆) = 2σ−2
¡
1+σ
2
−∆
¢3 − 1 = f(σ, ∆). Note also
that g(ν1;σ, ∆) is continuous in ν1 with a continuous first derivative ∂g/∂v1. For
0 ≤ ν1 ≤ 1+σ2 −∆, ∂g/∂v1 > 0 at both ν1 = 0 and ν1 =
1+σ
2
−∆. Since g(ν1;σ,∆) is a
cubic in ν1, with a negative coeﬃcient on ν13 then ∂g/∂v1 > 0 for 0 ≤ ν1 ≤ 1+σ2 −∆.
Similarly, for ∆
σ
− 1−σ
2σ
< ν1 ≤ 1, g(ν1;σ, ∆) is a cubic in ν1, with a positive
coeﬃcient on ν13. If 0.5 < ∆ then ∆σ −
1−σ
2σ
> 0.5 and ∂g/∂v1 < 0 at both ν1 =
∆
σ
− 1−σ
2σ
and ν1 = 1 so ∂g/∂v1 < 0 for ∆σ −
1−σ
2σ
< ν1 ≤ 1. Thus g(ν1;σ, ∆) reaches
a maximum in the interval 1+σ
2
−∆ < ν1 < ∆σ −
1−σ
2σ
. Hence, for 0.5 < ∆ < 1+σ
2
, (i)
K(σ, ∆) = {0.5}; (ii) at this stratification the matching types of µ1 and µ2 are (1,
1) respectively; and (iii) h(σ, ∆) = 0.5.
If 1+σ
2
2(1+σ)
≤ ∆ ≤ (resp. <) 0.5, then ∆
σ
− 1−σ
2σ
≤ (resp. <) 0.5 and ∂g/∂v1 ≥
(resp. >) 0 at v1 = ∆σ −
1−σ
2σ
; but at v1 = 1, ∂g/∂v1 < 0. Since, for ∆σ −
1−σ
2σ
< ν1 ≤ 1,
g(ν1;σ, ∆) is a cubic in ν1 with a positive coeﬃcient on ν13, it reaches a local
maximum in the interval [∆
σ
−1−σ
2σ
, 1]which (since ∂g/∂v1 < 0 for 0 < ν1 < ∆σ−
1−σ
2σ
) is
a maximum over the interval [0, 1]. Thus for 1+σ
2
2(1+σ)
≤ ∆ ≤ 0.5, the set K(σ, ∆) has a
single element k(σ,∆) defined by the first order condition ∂g/∂v1 = 0, with k(σ, 0.5)
= 0.5 and h(σ, 0.5) = 0.5. Elementary calculus then shows that for 1+σ
2
2(1+σ)
≤ ∆ <
0.5 (i) ∂k(σ, ∆)/∂∆ exists and is strictly negative, implying k(σ, ∆) > 0.5 so that
at this stratification the matching types of µ1 and µ2 are (2, 1) respectively; (ii)
∂h(σ, ∆)/∂∆ exists and is strictly negative, implying h(σ, ∆) > 0.5.
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2.1.2 1−σ
2
≤ ∆ ≤ 1+σ2
2(1+σ)
In this case, as ν1 increases from 0 to 1, the
matching types of µ1 and µ2 are (1, 2) respectively, then (2, 2), then (2, 1). More
precisely, g(ν1;σ, ∆) =


6ν1 (1− ν1)− 1 + 2σ−2
¡
1+σ
2
− v1 −∆
¢3
if 0 ≤ ν1 ≤ ∆σ −
1−σ
2σ
6ν1 (1− ν1)− 1 + 2σ−2
¡
1+σ
2
− v1 −∆
¢3
+ 2σ−2
¡
σν1 −∆+ 1−σ2
¢3
if ∆
σ
− 1−σ
2σ
≤ ν1 ≤ 1+σ2 −∆
6ν1 (1− ν1)− 1 + 2σ−2
¡
σν1 −∆+ 1−σ2
¢3
if 1+σ
2
−∆ ≤ ν1 ≤ 1.
(21)
Again, if ν1 = 0 or 1, then g(ν1;σ, ∆) = 2σ−2
¡
1+σ
2
−∆
¢3 − 1 = f(σ, ∆). Note also
that g(ν1;σ, ∆) is continous in ν1 with a continuous first derivative ∂g/∂v1.By a sim-
ilar argument to that above, the derivative of 6ν1 (1− ν1)−1+2σ−2
¡
1+σ
2
− v1 −∆
¢3
,
and hence ∂g/∂v1, is positive for 0 ≤ ν1 ≤ 1+σ2 −∆.
If σ/2 ≤ ∆, then by a similar argument to that above, the ∂g/∂v1 is positive
for 0 ≤ ν1 ≤ 1+σ2 − ∆. At v1 = 1, ∂g/∂v1 < 0, and since for
1+σ
2
− ∆ ≤ ν1 ≤ 1
the function g(ν1;σ, ∆) is a cubic with a positive coeﬃcient on ν13, this implies
that g(ν1;σ, ∆) must reach its maximum over the domain [0, 1] for some unique ν1
between 1+σ
2
−∆ and 1 defined by the first order condition ∂g/∂v1 = 0.If σ/2 ≤ ∆,
then 1+σ
2
−∆ ≤ 0.5 ≤ 1 but ∂g/∂v1 > 0 at v1 = 0.5; hence k(σ, ∆) > 0.5. Since ν1
∈
£
1+σ
2
−∆, 1
¤
the matching types of µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 are (2, 1) respectively..
If σ/2 > ∆, then it is possible that the first order condtion is satisfied for
v1 <
1+σ
2
−∆.Although ∂g/∂v1 > 0 at v1 = 0.5, so k(σ, ∆) > 0.5, this would imply
that the the matching types of µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 are (2, 2) respectively. More precisely, if
σ > eσ where ∂g/∂v = 0 at v1 = 1+σ2 −∆ and σ = eσ, then µ∗1 and µ∗2 are both type
2.
Elementary calculus then shows that ∂k(σ, ∆)/∂∆ exists and is strictly nega-
tive, and that ∂h(σ, ∆)/∂∆ exists and is strictly negative, implying h(σ, ∆) > 0.5.
In both Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, g(0;σ, ∆) = g(1;σ, ∆) = f(σ, ∆), and
∂g/∂v1 < (resp. >) 0 for v1 < (resp. >) k(σ, ∆), implying g(ν1;σ, ∆) ≥ f(σ, ∆)
for all 0 < ν1 < 1.
2.2: σ = 1
We consider the case where 0 < |∆| ≤ 1, with σ = 1 and ∆ = 0 considered in
Section 3.3 of this Appendix. For 0.5 ≤ |∆| ≤ 1, equation (20) continues to hold,
and it is simple to verify that a maximum is reached when v1 = 0.5 with µ1 and µ2
both being of type 1 and h(1, ∆) = 0.5.
If 0 < |∆| < 0.5, then equation (21) holds, and again a maximum is reached
when v1 = 0.5 with µ1 and µ2 both being of type 2. and h(1, ∆) = 0.5+4(0.5−|∆|)3.
This is decreasing in |∆| .
3. µ is a type 3 matching: |∆| ≤ 1−σ
2
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In this case, as ν1 increases from 0 to 1, the matching types of µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 are
(1, 3) respectively, then (2, 3), then (3, 2), then (3, 1). More precisely g(ν1;σ, ∆) =



6ν1 (1− ν1) + (1+σ)2 (1− v1)
3 − 3(1−σ)
2
(1− v1)( 2∆1−σ + v1)2 if 0 ≤ ν1 ≤
1−σ
2
−∆
6ν1 (1− ν1) + (1+σ)2 (1− v1)
3 − 3(1−σ)
2
(1− v1)( 2∆1−σ + v1)2 + 2σ−2(ν1 −
1−σ
2
+∆)3
if 1−σ
2
−∆ ≤ ν1 ≤ 12 −
∆
1−σ
6ν1 (1− ν1) + 1+σ2 v31 −
3(1−σ)
2
v1(1− v1 − 2∆1−σ )2 + 2σ−2
¡
1+σ
2
−∆− v1
¢3
if 1
2
− ∆
1−σ ≤ ν1 ≤
1+σ
2
−∆
6ν1 (1− ν1) + 1+σ2 v31 −
3(1−σ)
2
v1(1− v1 − 2∆1−σ )2 if
1+σ
2
−∆ ≤ ν1 ≤ 1
If µ is a type 3 matching, the function g exhibits a form of symmetry that
greatly simplifies the analysis. Manipulation of the formulae above shows that for
v1 ≤ bv = 12 − ∆1−σ
g(1− λν1;σ,∆)− f(σ,∆) = λ3{g(ν1;σ,∆)− f(σ,∆)} (22)
where λ = 1−bvbv . This has three main implications:
(i) Typically the function g has two local maxima, labelled v1(1) and v1(2) such
that v1(1) < bv < v1(2), in which case v1(1)bv = 1−v1(2)1−bv . For ∆ > 0 (and thus λ > 1)
then for any ν1 < bv, whatever the gain to stratification g− f , there exists ν2 = λν1
that multiplies the gain to stratification by a factor of λ3; a global maximum will
therefore be achieved by some v1 greater than bv (i.e. by some v2 less than 1− bv).
Similarly if ∆ < 0, and λ < 1 then a global maximum will be achieved by some v1
less than v1 less than bv
(ii) As before it is easily verified that g(0;σ, ∆) = g(1;σ, ∆) = f(σ, ∆) =
1+σ
2
− 6
1−σ∆
2, but in addition if v1 = bv then g(ν1;σ, ∆) = f(σ, ∆). As pointed
out in Section 3, with an unstratified type 3 matching the population nevertheless
“self-stratifies”, in the sense that in equilibrium a matched couple are either both
shorter or both taller than a height h = w− sw ∆1−σ . Imposing a stratification v1 = bv
would define h as the boundary between the two strata and therefore have no eﬀect.
(iii) If ∆ = 0 (and so λ = 1), the function g is symmetric around v1 = 0.5.
If a global maximum is achieved by some v1 it is also achieved by 1 − v1; this
in turn implies a discontinuity in the function k(σ, ∆) at ∆ = 0, although the
correspondence K(σ, ∆) is upper-hemi continuous.
In the light of the above, we now assume that ∆ ≥ 0, and focus on the poperties
of g for 1
2
− ∆
1−σ ≤ ν1 ≤ 1.
3.1. ∆ > 0. and σ < 1.
It is more convenient to express g as a function eg of v2 rather than v1. Then
g(ν1;σ, ∆) = g(1− ν2;σ, ∆) = eg(ν2;σ,∆) =
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


f(σ,∆) + 3(1−σ)
2
v2(2(1− bv)− v2)2 − 3+σ2 v23 if.0 ≤ ν2 ≤ (1− σ)(1− bv)
f(σ,∆) + 3(1−σ)
2
v2(2(1− bv)− v2)2 − 3+σ2 v23 + 2σ2 (v2 − (1− bv)(1− σ))3
if (1− σ)(1− bv) ≤ ν2 ≤ 1− bv
At v2 = 0,eg(ν2;σ,∆) = f(σ,∆), and ∂eg/∂v2 = 6(1−σ)(1−bv)2. Between 0 and
(1−σ)(1−bv), it is easily shown that eg is concave in v2. At v2 = (1−σ)(1−bv), ∂eg/∂v2
= 6(1− σ)(1− bv)2(σ2 + σ − 1), which is positive if σ > σ∗ = √5−1
2
. At v2 = 1− bv,eg has a local minimum of f(σ,∆) with (left hand derivatives) ∂eg/∂v2 = 0 and
∂2eg/ (∂v2)2 > 0. Between (1 − σ)(1 − bv) and 1 − bv, eg is a cubic with a positive
coeﬃcient on v2 3, and ∂eg/∂v2 is continuous at v2 = (1 − σ)(1 − bv). Since eg(0;σ,
∆) = eg(1− bv;σ, ∆) = f(σ, ∆), this implies that for 0 ≤ ν2 ≤ 1− bv, eg(ν2;σ, ∆) has
a maximum uniquely defined by the first order condition ∂eg/∂v2 = 0. If σ < σ∗, the
maximising value of v2, 1− k(σ, ∆), is less than (1− σ)(1− bv) and µ∗1 and µ∗2 are
matching types 3 and 1 respectively. If σ > σ∗, 1− k(σ, ∆) > (1−σ)(1−bv) and µ∗1
and µ∗2 are types 3 and 2 respectively.
It is straightforward to verify that ∂g/dv1 > 0 at v1 = 0.5 , so k(σ, ∆) > 0.5.
Consider now the eﬀects on k(σ, ∆) of a marginal increase in ∆ when ∆ > 0.
We can exploit the fact that over the interval [0, 1] the function g(ν1;σ, ∆) has two
local maxima, at v1(1) and v1(2). Comparative static analysis shows that
∂v1(1)
∂∆ has
the same sign as
∆
1− σ −
1
2
+ v1 (1) +
ψ
σ2
(v1 (1)−
1− σ
2
+∆) (23)
where ψ = 1 if (1− σ)bv ≤ ν1 ≤ bv and 0 otherwise. Using bv = 12 − ∆1−σ and
v1(1)bv = 1−v1(2)1−bv , this is readily shown to equal
bv
1− bv
·
1
2
− ∆
1− σ − v1(2) +
ψ
σ2
(
1 + σ
2
−∆)− v1(2)
¸
which in turn has the same sign as ∂v1(2)
∂∆ . Since ∂bv/∂∆ < 0 and v1(1)bv = 1−v1(2)1−bv , they
cannot both increase or remain unchanged as ∆ increases. Thus ∂k/∂∆ < 0.
3.2. ∆ = 0. and σ < 1.
The analysis of 3.1 continues to apply, in that the function eg(ν2;σ, 0) is well
defined and between ν2 = 0 and ν2 = 0.5 has a single maximum. There is no
discontinuity at ∆ = 0 in eg(ν2;σ, ∆) or the derivative ∂eg/∂ν2, so the solution
to the first order condition ∂eg/∂ν2 = 0 is a continuous function of ∆. We denote
Lim∆→0k(σ, ∆) by bk(σ).We now investigate the properties of bk(σ) as σ approaches
0 or 1.For ∆ = 0, and so bν = 0.5, eg(ν2;σ, 0) =
f(σ, 0)+
3(1− σ)
2
v2(1−v2)2−
3 + σ
2
v2
3 if.0 ≤ ν2 ≤
(1− σ)
2
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f(σ, 0) +
3(1− σ)
2
v2(1− v2)2 −
3 + σ
2
v2
3 +
2
σ2
(v2 −
(1− σ)
2
)3 if
(1− σ)
2
≤ ν2 ≤ 0.5
For low values of σ, and in particular as σ → 0, the condition ∂eg/∂ν2 = 0 is satisfied
when µ1 and µ2 are types 3 and 1 respectively, the borderline between this and a
matching with types (3, 2) being defined by ∂eg/∂ν2 = 0 and ν2 = (1−σ)2 , yielding the
critical value of σ∗ =
√
5−1
2
. It is straightforward to show that dbk(σ)/dσ > 0 for any
σ strictly between 0 and 1, since over this range eg(ν2;σ, 0) is strictly concave in ν2.
Furthermore extending the domain of eg(ν2;σ, 0) to σ = 0, although economically
meaningless, would not generate a discontinuity in the maximising value of v2 since
there would be no discontinuity in eg(ν2;σ, 0) or its derivatives, in particular the
maximising value would be unique as ∂2eg(ν2;σ, 0)/ (∂ν2)2 would be strictly negative
at σ = 0. Limσ→0bk(σ) can thus be found by setting σ = 0 and solving ∂eg/∂ν2 = 0,
yielding a value of 3
4
.
By contrast, ∂2eg(ν2;σ, 0)/ (∂ν2)2 = 0 if σ = 1. Limσ→1bk(σ) can be found by
solving ∂eg/∂ν2 = 0 for σ < 1, and taking the limit as σ → 1. For σ > σ∗, ∂eg/∂ν2 =
3(1−σ)
2σ2
ϕ(v2) where ϕ(v2) = [4 (1 + σ + σ2) v22 − 4 (1 + σ2) v2 + 1− σ + σ2] . For σ <
1, any v2 is a solution of ∂eg/∂ν2 = 0 if and only if it is a solution of ϕ(v2) = 0. As
σ → 1, ϕ(v2) → (6ν2 − 1) (2v2 − 1), which has solutions v2 = 0.5 and v2 = 16 . The
former is clearly a minimum of eg(ν2;σ, 0), and thus v2 = 16 is the interior maximum
analysed above; i.e. Limσ→1bk(σ) = 56 .
3.3 ∆ = 0 and σ = 1.
In this case, eg(ν2;σ, ∆) = f(1, 0) = 1 for all v2.Because the sets M and
W are identical., whatever the stratification, M1 and W1 are identical, as are M2
and W2. Thus there is perfect assortment and h(1, 0) = 1. However, these are the
only circumstances under which perfect assortment can be obtained, even with an
optimally chosen stratification. To see this, note that if either ∆ 6= 0 or σ 6= 1 or
both, then it cannot be the case that both M1 = W1 and M2 = W2, whatever the
stratification. Therefore either f(σ, ∆1) or f(σ, ∆2) or both are less than 1; there is
some negative assortment in one or both of the strata and hence eρ = g(ν1;σ, ∆) < 1
for any v1.
Turning now to the eﬀects on k(σ, ∆) of a marginal increase in ∆, we confine
ourselves to establishing that for ∆ = 0, ∂h
∂∆ > 0. It is suﬃcient to evaluate the
derivative ∂g
∂∆ at r ∆ = 0 and v1 = k(σ, 0). Then
∂g
∂∆ has the same sign as 4v1(1 −
v1) − ψ
¡
1+σ−2v1
σ
¢2
. For ψ = 0 this is positive. For ψ = 1, this is positive if
κ = 2v − v2(1 + σ) + σv − σ+3
4
> 0. Now, for σ = 1, κ = (2v − 1)(1− v), which is
positive. But ∂κ/∂σ = − (v − 0.5)2 < 0, implying that ∂g
∂∆ > 0 for σ < 1.
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